MARTHA’S (AND STEVE’S) GOOD FAITH: AN OFFICER’S
DUTY OF LOYALTY AT THE INTERSECTION OF GOOD
FAITH AND CANDOR
JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY1
This short paper begins to explore whether a corporate officer’s duty of good
faith extends to public disclosures of personal facts. To illustrate the factual
scenarios I have in mind, I begin with two simple, well-known examples:
•
•

Martha Stewart’s alleged failure to accurately and completely disclose details
of her 2001 disposition of shares of ImClone Systems, Inc. – a security held
as a personal investment – to Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia; and
Assumed deficiencies and delays in Steve Jobs’s disclosures to Apple Inc.
about his health in 2008 and 2009.

Martha Stewart’s alleged disclosure failure resulted in both a criminal
securities fraud action (in which she was acquitted)2 and a state law fiduciary duty
action (which was dismissed “because the plaintiff failed to make pre-suit demand on
the corporation’s board of directors and failed to demonstrate demand futility.”).3
Steve Jobs’s assumed disclosure deficiencies resulted in an SEC investigation.4 I
have written about these and other similar incidents in the past, focusing on the
federal securities law disclosure duties that may compel disclosure of personal facts
by an executive officer.5 But an unresolved question continues to nag at me: in the
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post-Stone v. Ritter,6 post-Gantler v. Stephens7 era in which we now live, is the absence
or inadequacy of an executive officer’s disclosure of personal facts to either the
board of directors or the shareholders8 a breach of the duty of good faith and, as a
result, of the fiduciary duty of loyalty under Delaware law? A number of
commentators have focused on the potential duty of a corporate officer to disclose
matters to boards of directors,9 but this paper explores the possibility that an officer
might also owe a direct duty of disclosure of personal facts to shareholders.10
Recent Delaware Supreme Court jurisprudence locates the answer to this
question at the intersection of the duty of good faith, the duty of disclosure (or
candor), and the applicability of fiduciary duties to corporate officers. Accordingly,
in a preliminary analysis, this paper first describes that jurisprudence and then applies
it to executive disclosures of personal facts. Finally, this paper closes with a brief
conclusion that includes a cautionary note about the use of its findings in a litigation
setting.
Joan Heminway to The Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/01/more-on-stevej.html (Jan. 15, 2009).
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Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (clarifying the nature of the duty of good faith).

7

Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009) (explicitly holding that, in addition to
directors, corporate officers owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty).

8

An officer’s disclosure duty has two dimensions: disclosure to the corporation (i.e., the board of
directors) and disclosure to the shareholders (i.e., investors); however, one might conclude that an
officer owes his disclosure duty only to the board (which may then consider whether to release the
information to shareholders). See generally Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them:
Corporate Officers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221 (2009) (suggesting an express
expansion of the duty of candor in Delaware to mandate disclosure to directors); Donald C.
Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187,
1194 (2003) (“There are many fascinating angles to an inquiry into whether corporate agents have an
affirmative duty to disclose information to their superiors, a category that includes – at the very top of
the corporate pyramid – the board of directors.”). This makes especially good sense for information
in the possession of an officer that is generated by or through the business or operations of the
corporation, as managed by the board, because the board should be able to control the use of
corporate information. See id. at 1200 (explaining, in the context of a CEO’s duty to disclose facts to
the board of directors, that “[w]hat the employment relationship does, in essence, is to make the
principal the property holder of the agent’s work product. Ideas, innovations, and information
gathered within the scope of employment thus belong to the employer.”). It also makes good sense
because the officer owes fiduciary duties to the corporation. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
9

See Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers Under
Delaware Law, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 475 (2007); German, supra note 8; Langevoort, supra note 8.
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This type of duty might stem from proxy disclosure controversies. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 110809 (1996) (“At least one observer has suggested that a fiduciary duty of directors and officers to
disclose material facts to stockholders can be traced to cases which apply common-law principles to
evaluate claims of false or misleading solicitation of proxies.”).
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I. AN OFFICER’S DUTY OF GOOD FAITH UNDER DELAWARE LAW
With due respect to the Delaware Supreme Court, the law regarding the duty
of good faith has been all over the map throughout the past 20 years.11 In 1993, the
Delaware Supreme Court identified good faith as one of a triad of fiduciary duties.12
This made sense because the court’s formulation of the business judgment rule
appeared to give equal weight to good faith, informed judgment (i.e., duty of care),
and actions taken in the best interest of the corporation (i.e., duty of loyalty).13 The
precise contents of the duty of good faith, as a newly minted fiduciary duty, therefore
became a key focus for law scholars (as well as judges and practitioners).14 To that
end, the Disney litigation gave us some important benchmarks, informing us – among
other things – that irrationality in board decision-making “may tend to show that the
decision is not made in good faith,”15 and that directors have breached their duty of
good faith when they have “consciously and intentionally disregarded their
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a
material corporate decision.”16 In a final opinion on this issue, the Disney court
outlined three ways the duty of good faith may be violated:

11

See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2007) (“The doctrine of good faith in Delaware corporate law
followed a rather twisted path on its way to Stone v. Ritter.”).
12

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); see Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,
10 (Del. 1998) (“The director’s fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders has been
characterized by this Court as a triad: due care, good faith, and loyalty. That triparte [sic] fiduciary
duty does not operate intermittently but is the constant compass by which all director actions for the
corporation and interactions with its shareholders must be guided.” (footnote omitted)).
13 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (identifying the business judgment rule as “a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.”); see also Hill & McDonnell, supra note 11, at 1772 (“[T]he business judgment rule provides
three ways in which a plaintiff may attempt to rebut the presumption: by showing that the directors
either did not act on an informed basis, did not act in good faith, or did not have an honest belief that
the action they took was in the best interests of the company.”).
14

See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 11, at 1773 (noting that early cases “gave no guidance as to what
the duty might entail”); Mark Loewenstein, The Diverging Meaning of Good Faith, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L.
433, 438 (2009) (“In the corporate arena, the Delaware courts have struggled to define the duty of
good faith.”).
15
16

Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (emphasis omitted). The
Delaware Supreme Court later endorsed this formulation and clarified that it is equivalent to the
Chancery Court’s post-trial formulation of the duty – an “intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard
for one’s responsibilities,” and “[d]eliberate indifference and inaction in the face of a duty to act.” In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62 (Del. 2006) (emphasis in the original).
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A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties. There may be
other examples of bad faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these
three are the most salient.17
Later in 2006, however, the duty of good faith landscape changed a bit. In its
decision in Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that the duty of good
faith is not itself a fiduciary duty distinct from the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty.18 Rather, the court situated the duty of good faith within the duty of loyalty.19
This was “news” to many students of Delaware fiduciary duty law.20 However, Stone
and its progeny did not change the essential contents of the duty of good faith.21
The latest twist? Recent Delaware Supreme Court jurisprudence has
confirmed that officers, as well as directors, owe fiduciary duties to the corporation,22
17

In re Disney, 906 A.2d at 67. See also Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 357 (Del. Ch. 2007) (indicating
that bad faith may include “any action that demonstrates a faithlessness or lack of true devotion to the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders.”).

18

Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (“[A] failure to act in good faith is not conduct that
results, ipso facto, in the direct imposition of fiduciary liability.”).

19

Id. at 369-70. See also Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A, No. 3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125,
at *19 n.27 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2008) (“Now, in light of Stone, it is the duty of loyalty that serves as the
legal framework for liability for a failure to act in good faith.”); Midland Grange No. 27 Patrons of
Husbandry v. Walls, C.A. No. 2155-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *43-44 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28,
2008) (“The duty of loyalty entails a subsidiary duty to act in good faith. Thus, a corporate fiduciary’s
failure to act in good faith may result in a breach of the duty of loyalty if the fiduciary does not ‘act[ ]
in the good faith belief that her actions are in the best interest of the corporation.’” (footnotes
omitted)).

20

See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).

21

Id. at 14 (noting with approval the descriptions of “good faith” in Caremark and Disney); In re
Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“A plaintiff can show
bad faith conduct by, for example, properly alleging particularized facts that show that a director
consciously disregarded an obligation to be reasonably informed about the business and its risks or
consciously disregarded the duty to monitor and oversee the business.” (emphasis in original)).

22

Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009). Earlier cases indicating the officers have
fiduciary duties to the corporation include In re World Health Alternatives, 385 B.R. 576, 591-93
(Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (concluding that officers of Delaware corporations have fiduciary duties); In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 15452, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, at *14 (Del. Ch. Sept.
10, 2004) (“To date, the fiduciary duties of officers have been assumed to be identical to those of
directors.”); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[A]bsent
grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged with
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including the duty of good faith as construed under Stone.23 This development raises
the possibility that an executive like Martha Stewart or Steve Jobs could be sued for a
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty (as a result of a breach of the duty of good
faith) for failing to accurately or adequately disclose personal facts. However, much
in the area of officer fiduciary duties remains to be said.24
II. OFFICER MISSTATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS TO STATE PERSONAL FACTS
AS A BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
An action against an officer for a breach of the duty of good faith based on
the misstatement of (or, possibly, an omission to state) a personal fact is, in essence,
a duty of loyalty claim based on a bad faith disclosure failure.25 This adds the duty of
disclosure to the already heady mix of duties implicated in a personal facts disclosure
scenario like that involving Martha Stewart or Steve Jobs. Shareholder disclosure
cases arise under Delaware fiduciary duty law in two principal contexts: (1)
communications to shareholders in connection with the solicitation of a shareholder
vote or other shareholder activity; and (2) communications to shareholders outside
the context of shareholder action.26 An officer’s inaccurate or incomplete disclosure
wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the honesty of their dealings on the
company’s behalf.”).
23

An earlier case indicated that officers could be liable for bad-faith decisions. Stanziale v. Nachtomi
(In re Tower Air, Inc.), 416 F.3d 229, 239 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The officers’ alleged passivity in the face of
negative maintenance reports seems so far beyond the bounds of reasonable business judgment that
its only explanation is bad faith.”).

24

See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS.
LAWYER 1105 (Aug. 2009).

25

In the seminal Delaware case on the duty of disclosure, the court frames its analysis in this way:
The issue in this case is not whether Mercury’s directors breached their duty of
disclosure. It is whether they breached their more general fiduciary duty of loyalty
and good faith by knowingly disseminating to the stockholders false information
about the financial condition of the company. The directors’ fiduciary duties
include the duty to deal with their stockholders honestly.

Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). See also, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder
Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 597-98 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[W]here there is reason to believe that the board lacked
good faith in approving a disclosure, the violation implicates the duty of loyalty.”).
26

Malone, 722 A.2d at 11-12. The Malone court mentions a third context (communications to the
market or, in the court’s words, “fraud on the market”), which it properly notes is governed by federal
law in most cases and, potentially, state law in areas that federal law does not cover. Id. at 11, 12-14.
This raises an interesting question about whether, in certain cases, misstatements and omissions of
personal facts would be considered by Delaware courts to be preempted by the application of federal
antifraud prohibitions. Id. at 13 (“In deference to the panoply of federal protections that are available
to investors in connection with the purchase or sale of securities of Delaware corporations, this Court
has decided not to recognize a state common law cause of action against the directors of Delaware
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of a personal fact could occur in either situation, but more typically would occur
separate from a request for shareholder action. I therefore focus on that context
here. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, “[w]hen the directors disseminate
information to stockholders when no stockholder action is sought, the fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty and good faith apply. Dissemination of false information
could violate one or more of those duties.”27
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, liability for breach of the duty of
loyalty in this context results from the knowing dissemination of false information to
shareholders.28 In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court has said that “fiduciaries,
corporate or otherwise, may not use superior information or knowledge to mislead
others in the performance of their own fiduciary obligations.”29 Moreover,
“[p]laintiffs must at the very least allege some connection between the lack of
disclosure and an actual harm.”30 In light of Gantler,31 the same principles and
elements that apply to disclosure failures by directors also apply to disclosure failures
by executives and other officers. Therefore, an aggrieved shareholder may have a
viable action against an executive like Martha Stewart or Steve Jobs if the executive
corporations for ‘fraud on the market.’” (footnote omitted)). See also Johnson & Garvis, supra note 24,
at 1124 (“Without . . . attention, the sanctioning and regulation of officers may continue to migrate to
the federal government – notably, to the SEC – and away from state law. If that happens . . . we
would have – perhaps we already have – an incomplete federalism in corporate law, with directors
attended to by state law and officers by federal law.”).
27

Malone, 722 A.2d at 12 (Note that the court’s formulation of the applicable fiduciary duties includes
the duty of good faith as a separate fiduciary duty, since the Malone case predates the Stone case.). See
also id. at 14 (“When the directors are not seeking shareholder action, but are deliberately
misinforming shareholders about the business of the corporation, either directly or by a public
statement, there is a violation of fiduciary duty.”). In an earlier case, the Delaware Supreme Court
clarified the context in which a disclosure failure would implicate the duty of care. See Zirn v. VLI
Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1062 (Del. 1996) (“A good faith erroneous judgment as to the proper scope or
content of required disclosure implicates the duty of care rather than the duty of loyalty.”). That
context is not applicable here. See also Hill & McDonnell, supra note 11, at 1783 (“A decision violates
only the duty of care when the misstatement or omission was made as a result of a director’s
erroneous judgment with regard to the proper scope and content of disclosure, but was nevertheless
made in good faith. Conversely, where there is reason to believe that the board lacked good faith in
approving a disclosure, the violation implicates the duty of loyalty.” (quoting In re Tyson Foods, 919
A.2d at 597-98)).

28

Malone, 722 A.2d at 10 (attributing liability to “knowingly disseminating to the stockholders false
information”). See also id. at 14 (“When the directors are not seeking shareholder action, but are
deliberately misinforming shareholders about the business of the corporation, either directly or by a
public statement, there is a violation of fiduciary duty.”).
29

Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283 (Del. 1989).

30

In re Tyson Foods, 919 A.2d at 597 (footnote omitted).

31

Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009).
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knowingly disseminates false or misleading personal facts and that disclosure failure
harms the shareholder. Presumably, the action would be direct in nature, since the
shareholder must prove harm and should be entitled to any recovery or other
remedy.32
Omissions to state personal facts raise different, thornier issues.33 Delaware
law regarding corporate disclosure duties does not contemplate or endorse a cause of
action against a director for an omission to state facts, except in the context of a
request for a shareholder vote or other action. In fact, cases repudiate the purported
existence of any independent duty to disclose or duty of candor.34 Perhaps a court
considering the matter would find or extrapolate a duty to disclose private facts
based on an executive’s overall fiduciary duty of loyalty to shareholders. Should we
penalize executives like Martha Stewart and Steve Jobs under state law fiduciary duty
standards for making bad-faith decisions to withhold personal information from
public distribution in the absence of an affirmative duty to disclose? If a cause of
action is afforded to shareholders for an officer’s omission to state personal facts, we
should (at a minimum) require the same elements of proof as those personal facts
required for false or misleading statements – namely, knowing conduct that harms a
corporate shareholder.35

32

See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del 2004) (en banc) (discarding
the “special injury” test for determining whether fiduciary duty actions are derivative or direct in favor
of a two-part test analyzing “who suffered the alleged harm” and “who would receive the benefit of
any recovery or other remedy.”).

33

See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Lit., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del Ch. 1996) (noting, in the
oversight context, that the theory that directors may be liable for omissions to act “is possibly the
most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”).

34 See, e.g., Malone, 722 A.2d at 11 (“In the absence of a request for stockholder action, the Delaware
General Corporation Law does not require directors to provide shareholders with information
concerning the finances or affairs of the corporation.”).
35

One scholar notes the following, consistent with this approach.
In one sense, the question of when directors should be liable for their mere
omissions admits of a deceptively simple answer: wrongful omissions should be
treated no worse and no better than wrongful decisions deliberately undertaken.
Put another way, the standard for wrongfulness for omissions should be the same
as the standard of wrongfulness for deliberate decisions. Such a view seems
sensible because there is no obvious reason to treat wrongful omissions more or
less harshly than wrongful decisions. Moreover, the essence of the claim is – in
some form or other – negligence, and the standard economic analysis of negligence
does not distinguish between active and passive conduct. Whether active or
passive in a causal sense, a party is negligent in the economic interpretation of
negligence if the party could have modified its conduct at a cost less than the
expected cost of the accident. It seems, therefore, that corporate law similarly
ought to make no distinction between directors who make a deliberate decision
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III. CONCLUSION
For those who are angry with or aggrieved by the perceived misstatements of
personal facts and omissions to state personal facts of the Martha Stewarts and Steve
Jobses of the world, this short paper may give them some hope and comfort that an
action for fiduciary duty, as well as an action for securities fraud, may exist when an
executive misrepresents or fails to disclose personal facts. Indeed, the preliminary
analysis set forth in this paper indicates that current articulations of the Delaware law
on duties of good faith and disclosure may support officer liability for misstatements
of (and perhaps even omissions to state) personal facts as a breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty.
A question remains, however, as to whether (and, if so, when) a cause of
action for a breach of the duty of good faith should be brought against a corporate
officer for disclosure failures relating to personal matters.36 For one thing, we should
be worried about privacy, free speech, and (in cases like Stewart’s) self-incrimination,
which I address in an earlier work.37 Individual rights in these areas are not
insignificant, and the tensions created by an overlap of positive regulation and
constitutional provisions are difficult to resolve.38 In fact, the balancing of disclosure
requirements and specific individual rights may differ based on the nature of the
right and the specific facts at issue.39 Litigants and the courts may together resolve
these tensions and perform the required balancing . Although the courts, with their
relative independence from political influence, may appear to be a good place to
leave these kinds of decisions, scholars should continue to question whether litigants
and courts are the appropriate gatekeepers for these causes of action. Certainly,
legislatures can limit the need for judicial decision-making or guide it with thoughtful
rulemaking.40

harmful to the corporation and directors who fail to act when they should have in
order to prevent harm to the corporation.
Robert T. Miller, Wrongful Omissions by Corporate Directors: Stone v. Ritter and Adapting the Process Model of
the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 911, 912 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
36 See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 11, at 1787 (noting that “the scope of good faith liability is
uncertain, and will thus increase litigation and litigation costs.”).
37

See Heminway, Personal Facts, supra note 5, at 772-83.

38

Id. at 774-83.

39

This may be a reason why Martha Stewart was sued based on her alleged investment disclosure
lapses. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004). Steve Jobs has, to my knowledge, not yet
been sued for his lapses.

40

I suggest that the SEC take this kind of action in the securities fraud area in my earlier work. See
Heminway, Personal Facts, supra note 5, at 789-801.
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In addition, prospective plaintiffs should understand from this paper that the
threshold for liability is quite high in good faith and disclosure cases.41 Under Disney,
it appears that conduct must be intentional or fraudulent in order for a plaintiff to
have the potential of succeeding in a good faith case; claims based on gross
negligence will not be successful.42 Moreover, under Malone, liability only exists for
faulty disclosures that are made knowingly or deliberately.43 In other words, actions
for breach of the duty of loyalty in this context, especially those relating to personal
facts, should not be seen as a magic pill to cure the perceived evils of executive
disclosure abuses.
Finally, it is important to note that disclosure duties typically are qualified by
and limited to the importance and relevance of the information at issue. In general,
only material personal facts would be the subject of any officer’s disclosure duty.44
41

In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[T]he burden to
show bad faith is even higher.. . . The presumption of the business judgment rule, the protection of an
exculpatory § 102(b)(7) provision, and the difficulty of proving a Caremark claim together function to
place an extremely high burden on a plaintiff to state a claim.”); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967
A.2d 640, 653 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“[O]ur Supreme Court has held that to hold a disinterested director
liable for a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty for acting in bad faith, a strong showing of
misconduct must be made.”).

42

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006) (“[G]rossly negligent conduct,
without more, does not and cannot constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”); see
also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (“[A] failure to act in good faith requires conduct
that is qualitatively different from, and more culpable than, the conduct giving rise to a violation of
the fiduciary duty of care (i.e., gross negligence).”); Ryan ex rel. Maxim Integrated Prods. v. Gifford,
C.A. No. 2213-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1, at *23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2009) (“In order to recover at trial
. . . plaintiffs would be required to meet their burden of proof . . . a task that should not be
underestimated when a party is required to show intent or fraud.”); Kahn v. Portnoy, C.A. No. 3515CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 184, at *26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008) (“[D]irector action that constitutes
mere gross negligence – a violation of the duty of care – cannot constitute bad faith.”); McPadden v.
Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1263 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“[I]t is quite clearly established that gross negligence,
alone, cannot constitute bad faith. Thus, a board of directors may act ‘badly’ without acting in bad
faith.” (footnote omitted)); Torch Liquidating Trust v. Stockstill, C.A. No. 07-133, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19535, at *31 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 2008) (“Plaintiff must allege that scienter and/or an intent to
deceive in order to establish the inapplicability of the business judgment rule’s strong presumption.”);
Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 358 (Del. Ch. 2007) (indicating that “the intentional violation of a
shareholder approved stock option plan, coupled with fraudulent disclosures regarding the directors’
purported compliance with that plan, constitute conduct that is disloyal to the corporation, and is
therefore an act in bad faith.”).
43

Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9-14 (Del. 1998). See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.

44 See, e.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 279-81 (Del. 1977) (construing the
requirement that a majority shareholder owes a minority shareholder a duty to disclose all information
germane to a transaction by reference to the federal securities law materiality standard); Kelly v. Bell,
254 A.2d 62, 71 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff’d 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970) (“[D]irectors owe a duty to honestly
disclose all material facts when they undertake to give out statements about the business to
stockholders.” (emphasis added)).
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Arguably, personal facts are less likely to rise to this threshold level of importance or
relevance than corporate facts.45 Accordingly, even if a plaintiff is sanguine about
individual rights and can meet the high burdens of proof in a particular case, a
defendant officer may be able to argue that the undisclosed information is not
important or relevant enough to trigger liability.
Despite these cautionary notes, I think it is important for scholars and other
commentators to consider and further analyze the possibility of actions for breach of
fiduciary duty in connection with executive disclosures of personal facts for at least
two reasons. First, executive disclosure issues regarding personal facts seem to arise
more now in a public light than ever before. With our current informationoverloaded society, the corporate and personal lives of founding and otherwise
iconic executives – like Martha Stewart and Steve Jobs – are far more public.46 The
press builds these executives up and, when provoked, tears them down, in each case
reinforcing public notions (accurate and inaccurate) that shareholder value is tied to
the executives’ every move.47 Our federal and state laws on officer disclosures in the
corporate context (largely decisional law) are inherently reactive and have not yet
fully caught up with that phenomenon. Second, a more fulsome analysis of the duty
of loyalty (and the subsidiary duties of good faith and disclosure) in the executive
disclosure context may be helpful to the judiciary and the bar in tailoring and
reforming fiduciary duty law in Delaware and elsewhere. It is important that we keep
that conversation going outside symposia, lecture halls, and classrooms, and that as
many participants as possible contribute to the dialogue.
Accordingly, this paper invites further commentary, supportive and critical,
on whether a corporate officer’s duty of good faith extends (or should extend) to
public disclosures of personal facts. Given the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions
in Stone and Gantler, the door is left open to scholarly and judicial interpretation.
Those who take up the challenge may have a role in shaping fiduciary duty doctrine
under Delaware corporate law.
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See Heminway, Personal Facts, supra note 5, at 764-65.

46 Cf. Johnson & Garvis, supra note 24, at 1105 (“Undeniably, corporate executives wield great power
and are critical to company success, and they generally play central roles in corporate failure and
scandal as well.”).
47

Id.

